

Brunswick Regional Water & Sewer H2GO
Resolution to Establish Voting Districts
Resolution 2024-11-1

WHEREAS, Brunswick Regional Water & Sewer H2GO is a sanitary district, a body politic, and corporate organization existing pursuant to NCGS Chapter 130A, Article II, Part 2, and

WHEREAS, The North Carolina General Assembly, through Session Law 2024-38, amended GS 130A-50 to require a sanitary district to adopt single-member residency districts for the purposes of the election of members of the sanitary district board; and


WHEREAS, The North Carolina General Assembly, through Session Law 2024-38, amended GS 130A-50 to require members of a sanitary district board to serve staggered four-year terms and the staggering shall be taken into consideration when adopting or revising the single-member residency districts; and

WHEREAS, Brunswick Regional Water & Sewer H2GO commissioned the Cape Fear Council of Governments (CFCOG) to prepare a voting districts study, referenced herein and attached as Exhibit A.


NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that Brunswick Regional Water & Sewer H2GO Board has selected Alternate 1 in Exhibit A to establish single-member residency district boundaries as required by GS 130A-50(h).

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, single-member residency district board members shall serve staggered four-year terms with Districts 2, 3, and 4 to begin December 1, 2025; and Districts 1 and 5 to begin December 6, 2027.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, the clerk-to-the-board is directed to notice a public hearing on this matter for December 18, 2024.

Adopted November 13, 2024


Ronnie Jenkins
Chairman



Deana J. Greiner
Clerk-to-the-Board

MEMORANDUM

TO: H2GO Commissioners
FROM: Allen Serkin, Cape Fear Council of Governments
DATE: 07/15/2024
RE: Voting Districts

The Cape Fear Council of Governments (CFCOG) is in the process of developing and evaluating voting districts for H2GO. Before we progress further, I would like to meet with the Board to discuss the following considerations. Hopefully each of you will have an opportunity to review the information and think about how you recommend the Board move forward.

1. The project scope of work includes working with H2GO staff and commissioners to evaluate the pros and cons of electoral districts versus residency districts and select an alternative. Since that time the General Assembly has enacted HB 593, which instructs H2GO to establish “single-member residency district in which only a person residing in a single-member residency district shall be eligible as a candidate in the election for the seat apportioned to that single-member residency district, but candidates shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the entire sanitary district.” If commissioners are still interested in understanding the relative pros and cons of the different types of districts, I recommend that you review the attached 2010 article by retired UNC School of Government professor David Lawrence (it is dated but still relevant). It does a good job describing many of the pros and cons of district versus at-large elections. Unless the board would like to discuss this further, I will consider the matter resolved.
2. The attached 2021 article by UNC School of Government professor Robert Joyce suggests that local governments with residency district elections are not required to balance district populations following a federal census. The above-referenced article by David Lawrence suggests otherwise, as does NCGS 160A-23.1 and HB 593. The public will also likely expect districts with balanced populations. *I recommend that the Board agree to develop voting districts with balanced populations and instruct their attorney to research whether rebalancing will be required after annexations and after each federal census.*
3. Districts can be constructed in a variety of ways, but there are some guiding principles I typically recommend for a variety of reasons, and *I recommend that the Board direct me use the following guiding principles in developing district boundaries:*
 - a. District boundaries should follow Census 2020 block boundaries, except where the H2GO boundary does not follow block boundaries.
 - b. District boundaries should follow major roadways, railroads, waterways, subdivision boundaries, and parcel lines where possible.
 - c. District boundaries should comply with traditional redistricting criteria such as continuity, compactness, and avoiding contests between incumbents.
4. There is at least one circumstance where two Commissioners reside in close proximity and the character of the area makes it difficult to develop rational districts that follow the

guiding principles above without placing both Commissioners in the same district. Further, SB 750 says “districts established shall maximize the geographic diversity of the board...”
I recommend that the Board consider how this situation should be resolved.

5. The H2GO boundary is not coincident with census block boundaries. This means that some interpolation is necessary to estimate the population characteristics in any district alternatives developed. I propose the following methodology for estimating population characteristics in census blocks that are not entirely within the H2GO boundary: (1) utilizing Brunswick County GIS addresses data, filter out as many non-residential addresses as possible and then determine the share of resulting residential addresses in each block that is within the H2GO boundary; (2) multiply the share of residential addresses in the block by the census block characteristics to estimate the H2GO portion of the block characteristics. So for example, if a census block with a total population of 200 people has 100 residential addresses and 50 are in the H2GO boundary, then the H2GO population for that block will be estimated to be 100 (50% of 200). The same method would be used to calculate other characteristics of the block, like race or ethnicity. This methodology assumes equal distribution of the block characteristics within each address, which is unrealistic, but is a reasonable method to generate an estimate. *I recommend that the Board consider the methodology and agree that I will employ it in the redistricting process.*

District vs. At-large Elections

North Carolina law permits cities, towns, and villages to elect their governing board members through at-large elections; through district elections using either voting districts or residence districts; through elections that use “blended” districts, in which primaries are on a district basis and elections on a residence district basis; or through some combination of at large and district.

In *at-large* elections, voters from across the city vote for candidates running for office and the candidates do not represent a specific district within the city. Davidson and Korbel (1981) explain that the concept of at-large elections was originally developed by the Progressives. “While a major purpose of the structural reform was to take city government out of the hands of neighborhood and ethnic leaders, thus centralizing it under the control of businessmen, the ostensible reasons were the lofty goals of abolishing corrupt machines and bringing efficiency and businesslike principles to local government.”

When cities, towns, or villages use *district* elections, some or all members of the governing board represent specific districts within a city. With *voting districts*, only voters who live in a particular district may vote for candidates running for the seat representing that district. In *residence districts*, candidates must reside in the district but all voters in the city vote in the election for that district’s board member. In *blended districts*, which are used in voting systems with primaries, candidates must reside in the district, only district voters may participate in the primary, but all city voters participate in the general election.

In *mixed* systems, some number of candidates are elected on an at-large basis and some are elected on a district basis. The districts might be either voting districts or residence districts.

Possible effects of choosing at-large or district elections

Diversity

A principal effect of district elections, particularly those using voting districts, is that they facilitate election of minority candidates. For example, Welch (1990) found that district elections favor African American candidates. “No matter which representation measure is used, blacks are more often elected in district than at-large elections...Moreover, all cities with district elections and more than a 10 percent black population have at least some black representation, while a sizable minority of at-large and mixed cities do not yet have this representation.” Similarly, Troustine and Valdini found that racial diversity of councils increases with district elections; in their study the

mean number of different races in cities with at-large elections is 1.3 while the mean number for district elected members is 1.4. They also found that district elections are only helpful for increasing black and Latino representation when these groups are residentially segregated within a city. "When blacks are isolated, district elections increase their estimated proportion of city council seats to 7.7 percent from 5.4 percent under at-large systems; near parity with the 7.9 percent average proportion of African American residents in these cities. When blacks are not isolated districts have no significant effect on representation...Under at-large systems Latinos represent on average 2.3 percent of city councils. This nearly triples in district settings at 6.3 percent." Arrington and Watts (1991), though, found that *residence districts* did not offer this advantage: "Even more unresponsive [than at-large systems] are systems with at-large elections but district nominations. In these systems, black candidates have to run one-on-one against white candidates for specific seats instead of the more usual multi-seat arrangement."

Coming from the other direction, Arrington and Watts (1991) studied school board election results in North Carolina in 1987. They found: "At all levels of black registration, blacks are underrepresented in at-large systems."

Some research, however, suggests that use of districts with black majorities may actually dilute black political power. Meier et al. (2005) cite research reaching that conclusion and say that to the extent "that black Democrats are concentrated in legislative districts it is easier for Republican candidates to win more seats overall. The creation of a newly black district is likely to drain black voters from other districts, many of them represented by white Democrats."

If district elections are instituted to increase minority representation, and subsequently voting becomes less polarized along racial lines and/or voters become less geographically segregated, then districts may become less effective at serving that goal. Sass and Mehay (1995) examined local government election results in 1981 and 1991. They write: "Over the last decade, however, the ability of blacks to win local at-large elections has increased significantly, and the effect of district elections on black representation has correspondingly waned...Blacks, particularly those in the South, still fare better in district elections than in at-large elections, but the gap has narrowed to about one-half what it was in 1981...We conclude that the waning efficacy of district elections has been due to a general reduction in the racial polarization of voters."

If district elections lead to greater racial diversity on a governing board, this may in turn lead to greater diversity among professional staff. Researchers have found that in the case of school board elections, district elections appear to lead to an increase in the hiring of administrators and teachers who are of the same race as new board members. For example, Polinard, Wrinkle and Longoria (1990) studied 64 school districts in Texas

that had changed from at-large to district systems for school board elections. They found that district systems led to an increased number of Mexican-American school board members. They also found that an increase in Mexican-American board members was correlated with an increase in Mexican-American administrators and teachers. In another study of Texas school districts, Meier et al. (2005) showed that when district representation led to an increase in black membership on the school board, this was accompanied by an increase in the number of black administrators.

Some research indicates that women candidates may not do as well under district systems (as compared to at-large). For example, Trounstein and Valdin (2005) found that while single member districts are beneficial to minorities, they were not helpful for women.

District elections can also increase geographical diversity on a governing board. This is true with both voting districts and residence districts.

Effects on voters

Candidates in at-large elections may have difficulty meeting potential voters from across the entire city, with the result that voters may be less familiar with candidates. Scarrow (1999) explains: "In at-large elections, the many candidates whose names appear on the ballot, several of whom a voter must choose, have been recruited from a wide geographical area and have been required to campaign over a wide area, and consequently are often complete strangers to most of the electorate. Even incumbents may be unknown, having been unable to meet with most constituents and respond to their concerns during their term of office."

In district elections, candidates may have greater opportunity to meet with potential voters because they only have to focus on one district, not the entire city. Welch and Bledsoe (1986) suggest that district systems minimize the amount of financial resources necessary to win and therefore candidates who have minimal financial resources but strong neighborhood support may have better chances of getting elected. (This effect does not apply with residence districts.)

District elections may lead to lower voter turnout than at-large elections. Hajnal and Lewis (2003) found in their study of California cities that cities with district elections had lower turnout than cities with at-large elections, though they also suggest caution in interpreting their results: "We suspect that the negative relationship found in California is at least partially tied to the fact that district elections have often been instituted in cities where there has been a history of disenfranchisement of minorities and immigrant groups. Thus district elections are a response to low turnout rather than a cause of low turnout."

If the council elects all members from districts, a group that is in the minority in its own district might believe it has no representation at all on council.

In an at-large system, because each voter has an opportunity to vote for several candidates, he or she is more likely to have voted for at least one winning candidate. This might cause voters to feel more “represented” on the council.

With district elections citizens have a specific council member to whom they may turn for help with city problems and whom they can hold accountable for council actions.

Campaign costs

At-large campaigns may be more expensive to run, because a candidate must appeal to all the voters rather than those in a single district. At-large campaigns may also rely more on media advertising than grassroots work and thereby separate candidates from voters. The increased cost may hinder campaigns by lower income or minority candidates.

District elections, especially voting districts, may reduce the cost of running for public office. Welch and Bledsoe (1986) suggest that district systems minimize the amount of financial resources necessary to win and therefore candidates who have minimal financial resources but strong neighborhood support may have better chances of getting elected.

Effects on council decision-making

At-large candidates may take moderate stances in order to appeal to the broadest possible range of voters. Once elected, these candidates may come to the council already holding consensus views.

Council members in an at-large system may be more likely to have a city-wide focus rather than a district focus. Scarrow (1999) explains that Progressives cited the at-large system as a system to ensure that the overall public interest is served as compared to narrow interests. By contrast, though, Langbein, Crewson, and Brasher (1994) suggest that politicians who are elected at-large may also serve a specific constituency: “This constituency may be geographic; but, more likely, it will be a functional or a policy constituency (e.g., a group that is pro- or anti-growth or a downtown business group).” In a related vein, Edelman (2005) cites Welch and Bledsoe (1988) who found that at-large representatives spend less time serving as ombudsmen and instead focus on citywide and business constituencies.

Council members in an at-large system may not have an incentive to vote for increased spending in a particular section of the city because they serve the entire city (as compared to council members in a district system). In addition, it is suggested that there may be less “log-rolling” in at-large cities; log-rolling is the practice of one council member voting for another member’s projects as a means of securing support for one of his or her own projects in his or her own district. Edelman (2005), however, explains that researchers have found evidence to both support and disprove these claims.

Conversely, council members who represent districts may focus on their districts’ interests and ignore the interests of the broader city.

Council members elected under a district system may be more responsive to citizen preferences in making land use decisions, especially if voters are geographically concentrated. Langbein, Crewson and Brasher (1996) found that board members elected by districts are more responsive to their constituents’ preferences when making land-use decisions. They studied how elected officials made decisions about LULUs (locally undesirable land uses) and “Pork” projects like parks that all constituents would like to have located near them. They found: “For divisible policies that are not universally desirable, councils elected from wards are more likely than at-large councils to respond to the preferences of geographically concentrated groups- no matter whether those preferences are for a greater or smaller quantity of services.”

Some research has shown that councils elected under at-large systems may be more likely to raise taxes. Edelman (2005) cites Welch and Bledsoe (1988) who found that “the only significant difference between those elected by district and at-large was that at-large members favored raising taxes slightly more than those elected by district.”

Administrative effects

In district systems the council must redraw the district boundaries after each census and may have to do so after each annexation as well.

Effects of mixed at-large and district elections:

Having a combination of at-large and district members is an attempt to gain the advantages of both at-large elections and district elections. That is, with some board members elected at large, the hope is that they will consistently focus on city-wide concerns; and with some board members elected from districts, the hope is that the result will be increased minority or geographical representation on the governing board.

With a combination of at-large and district seats on the board, however, the number of district seats might not be sufficient to successfully increase minority

representation. Welch (1990) found that cities with mixed systems did not improve black representation to the same degree as cities using at-large systems. Welch studied every U.S. city with a 1984 population of at least 50,000 and a minimum of five percent Hispanic or black population in 1980. She found that “only slightly more than 10 percent of the cities with mixed electoral systems elect any blacks from the at-large portion of the mixed system.” She also found that within mixed election systems, Hispanics are considerably more likely to be elected in the district seats than the at-large ones.

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Time for Cities, Counties, and School Boards to Redistrict, But No Numbers!

Published: 03/01/21

Author Name: [Robert Joyce](#)

Update March 4, 2021: *In the days since this blog was posted, readers have sent me corrections to my lists. I am very grateful. The post below is updated to fix the lists. I think they are right now, but if anyone spots problems, please let me know.*

Here is the updated post:

These North Carolina cities have a problem, and there may be little they can do about it except wait and see if the General Assembly gives them some direction:

Ahoskie, Cary, Charlotte, Clinton, Edenton, Elizabeth City, Enfield, Erwin, Fayetteville, Greensboro, Greenville, Henderson, Hickory, Jacksonville, Kings Mountain, Lake Waccamaw, Laurinburg, Lexington, Longview, Lumberton, Mooresville, Mt. Olive, New Bern, Plymouth, Princeville, Raleigh, Roanoke Rapids, Rocky Mount, Sanford, St. Pauls, Siler City, Smithfield, Statesville, Tarboro, Whiteville, and Wilson.

They all have city elections coming up in 2021, and they all elect city council members from true electoral districts—meaning that only the voters of that district vote for that council seat. Every time there is a federal census, as there was in 2020, they must take the new census numbers, apply them to the old electoral districts, and determine whether the districts have gotten out of population balance over the course of 10 years since the last census. If they have, then the city council must draw new districts to bring them back into balance. Failure to do that is a violation of the U.S. Constitution.

After the census of 1990, cities drew new districts in 1991. And after the 2000 census, they drew new districts in 2001. And again after the 2010 census, new districts in 2011.

The schedule was always tight. The census numbers always came out in February or March, and the new districts had to be in place in time for the July candidate filing period ahead of the November elections. Cities had to hustle to get it done.

This year is dramatically different. The U.S. Census Bureau has said that the numbers needed for redistricting will not be available in February or March. In fact, they may not be available until the end of September.

Well, that just doesn't work. The candidate filing period for these cities for the election in November 2021 runs from July 28 to August 13. You have to have the districts in place before the filing period, so candidates know what seat to file their notices of candidacy for. But the new numbers are not expected until September.

So what are cities with true electoral districts to do?

Here is the answer, as far as I can figure it out.

First, wait for the General Assembly

For now, the thing cities can do is wait to see what, if anything, the General Assembly does.

The General Assembly, by statute, sets the time of municipal elections, and sets the time of candidate filing. The General Assembly can, if it chooses, delay the 2021 municipal elections, giving cities time to receive the new census numbers, draw the new districts, have candidates file, and go through the election. If the General Assembly does that, it will, at the same time, extend the terms of incumbent city council members who were to be up for re-election in 2021. They would simply stay in office until after the delayed elections. Yes, the General Assembly has the authority to do that.

It seems to me likely that the General Assembly will take some step to give guidance to cities.

Maybe the elections will be held at the time of the March 2022 primaries

In 2022, North Carolina will have elections for lots of offices—seats in the General Assembly, county commissioners, and many others. As the law now stands, the primaries for those elections are in March. The candidate filing periods are in December 2021. The General Assembly could delay the municipal elections until the time of the March primaries. That way, cities could get the census numbers in September and have districts in place in time for candidate filing in December. That's tight. Real tight. Even tighter than the way things worked in 1991 and 2001 and 2011.

Or maybe the March 2022 primaries will be moved to May 2022

In times past, the primaries ahead of the November elections were not in March but in May. The General Assembly could go back to that schedule, and set the delayed municipal elections for that time. That would create more breathing room, with the candidate filing period coming in February. If the census numbers become available in September, there should be time for city councils to draw districts by February.

Whatever the General Assembly decides, that's what cities with districts must do

If the General Assembly enacts legislation addressing the redistricting numbers problem, cities will, of course, be bound to do whatever the new law says. The General Assembly might say, simply, hold your 2021 elections using your old districts and redistrict in time for the 2023 elections.

What if the General Assembly does not enact new law?

What is a city to do if the General Assembly does not act?

Cities could continue on their regular schedule, using the old districts

Cities might think they are in a pickle if the General Assembly does not act. But I don't think they are. I think that if the General Assembly does not pass legislation, then cities that use true electoral districts must simply hold their 2021 elections on the regular schedule using their old districts.

Gasp!

Doesn't that mean that they may be using districts that are so out of whack, so imbalanced in population, that they violate the U.S. Constitution? Cities already have preliminary numbers that, for many of them, show that their districts are out of balance. Would they not be vulnerable to lawsuits challenging them on the imbalance?

Yes, I guess so. But, in fact, it seems to me that there is no alternative. And surely, a judge in such a lawsuit would understand the problem the city faced.

May cities delay their elections themselves?

The General Assembly can delay elections, in order to give cities time to draw new districts. But can cities do it on their own?

No.

When the census is normal, and the numbers arrive on the regular schedule, there is, in fact, a state statute that allows cities, on their own, to delay their elections after a census. If they determine that it would "most likely not be possible" to draw new districts by the filing period, then the city can, on its own, delay the elections for a year.

But that statute—[G.S. 160A-23.1](#)—assumes that the city has the census numbers and, for whatever reason, cannot get new districts in place. It begins this way: "As soon as possible after receipt of the federal decennial census information," the city council is to decide whether delay is required.

But in 2021, the census numbers won't be coming in time to make such a determination. I don't think this statute applies in 2021. And, further, the statute says that if districts cannot be available in time, and the elections are not delayed a year, then "the election shall be held on the regular schedule using the current electoral districts."

So, what to do?

If, in the end, the General Assembly does not enact new laws addressing elections in cities with true electoral districts, then those cities should, I think, simply carry on in their regular way, with elections in 2021.

This is a tough prescription. Cities would be holding elections in November 2021 that they know for a fact are unconstitutionally unbalanced. They will know that because by that time they will, presumably, have the new census numbers. They may be sued. But I do not see how cities can, without authorization from the General Assembly, do anything else.

Ten city special cases

Two cities with districts and even-year elections. In addition to the cities listed at the start of this blog post, two other cities use true electoral districts and must redistrict, like all the others. But they, like about 20 or so other North Carolina cities, have moved to even-year elections. One is *Albemarle*. Albemarle will elect city council members from districts in 2022, and so they are in the same boat as counties, discussed below. *Winston-Salem* is the other one. Winston-Salem

elects all its council members at the same time, every four years. Their next election is in 2024, so they have time.

Eight cities with districts but no district elections in 2021. Eight other cities that use true electoral districts and are on the normal odd-year schedule do not have districts elections in 2021. (They may have mayoral or at-large seat elections in 2021.) Their next district elections are in 2023. They are *Benson, Dunn, Fremont, Goldsboro, High Point, Reidsville, Robersonville, and Williamston.*

What about all the other cities?

The current problem directly affects cities that elect city council members from true electoral districts. But many, many cities in North Carolina—the vast majority—elect their city council members at-large. That is, all voters in the city vote for all seats. There are no districts. There is no need to redistrict. They are not affected by the delay in the census numbers. Unless the General Assembly should direct differently, they will hold their elections on the regular 2021 schedule.

In some cities, the voting is at large but the candidates must reside in defined districts. To be elected from District One, I must reside in District One, but everyone in the city votes for that seat. In that system there is no need to redistrict after a census, since the voting is done at large. These cities will hold their elections on the regular 2021 schedule, unless the General Assembly directs differently.

Whatever the General Assembly decides, that's what at-large cities must do

The General Assembly may enact new legislation to deal with the problem facing cities with true electoral districts. If the General Assembly delays elections for cities with districts, will it do the same thing for cities with at-large elections? I have no idea. But whatever the General Assembly provides by new law, that's what at-large cities must do.

What about counties with districts?

Cities have the biggest concern, because their elections are scheduled for this year. But these counties have the same concern, just not quite as urgent:

Anson, Bladen, Buncombe, Caswell, Chowan, Columbus, Craven, Cumberland, Duplin, Edgecombe, Forsyth, Franklin, Granville, Guilford, Halifax, Harnett, Jones, Lee, Lenoir, Mecklenburg, Montgomery, Nash, Orange, Pamlico, Pasquotank, Pitt, Robeson, Sampson, Vance, Washington, Wayne, and Wilson.

County elections are scheduled for 2022. The primaries are set for March and the candidate filing period is set for December 2021. So, if counties get their census numbers by the end of September, it is almost conceivable that they could have districts in place in time for candidate filing. But, in light of the [statutory](#) requirement for counties that redistricting plans must be in place 150 days before the primary, it would be difficult in the extreme.

So maybe the General Assembly will move the primaries to May and the filing period to February (or maybe March). That would give some breathing room.

Even if the General Assembly does delay the primaries to May, having the districts ready for February candidate filings will be a bit of a challenge.

What about school boards with districts?

Boards of education with members elected from true electoral districts have the same concerns.

Four of those school boards have members elected in odd-numbered years, including 2021, so they have the same concerns as cities. Those four are: *Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Hickory City, Lexington City, and Newton-Conover.*

The others elect their members in even-numbered years, so they have the same concerns as counties: *Alexander, Anson, Beaufort, Bladen, Caswell, Craven, Cumberland, Duplin, Durham, Edenton/Chowan, Edgecombe, Franklin, Granville, Guilford, Harnett, Iredell-Statesville, Lenoir, Madison, Martin, Montgomery, Nash-Rocky Mount, Pamlico, Pitt, Robeson, Rockingham, Union, Vance, Wake, Wayne, Whiteville City, Wilson, and Winston-Salem/Forsyth.*

Perhaps the General Assembly, if it enacts legislation affecting cities or counties or both will address school boards at the same time.

A final note: the Voting Rights Act

Cities, counties, and school boards across the state are free of a time pressure that in decades past affected many of them. In those past times, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required that redistricting plans for units of government covered by Section 5 (not all were) had to be approved by the U.S. Department of Justice before they could be put into effect. That process of “pre-clearance” took up part of the time available between the receipt of the census numbers and the time of candidate filing.

Section 5 is no longer enforced. There is no longer any requirement that any units of government submit their redistricting plans to the Department of Justice. That bit of time pressure is relieved.

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
District Elections Study

Alt1

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
Percentages represent the proposed district's estimated variance or deviation from a perfectly balanced population distribution.

Disclaimer: The data displayed is provided without warranty and that the user should consult public primary information sources, such as recorded deeds and plats, to verify the accuracy of the data provided.
 Data Sources: US Census Bureau, ESRI, NCCGIA, Brunswick County, H2GO, CFCOG.



Map prepared 9/9/2024 by:


 CAPE FEAR COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS



Brunswick Regional
H2GO
Water and Sewer

District Elections Study

Alt2




Percentages represent the proposed district's estimated variance or deviation from a perfectly balanced population distribution.

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
District Elections Study

Alt3




Percentages represent the proposed district's estimated variance or deviation from a perfectly balanced population distribution.

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H2GO
Water and Sewer

District Elections Study

Alt4


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Percentages represent the proposed district's estimated variance or deviation from a perfectly balanced population distribution.

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 Data Sources: US Census Bureau, ESRI, NCCGIA, Brunswick County, H2GO, CFCOG.



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District Elections Study

Alt5


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Percentages represent the proposed district's estimated variance or deviation from a perfectly balanced population distribution.

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H2GO
Water and Sewer

District Elections Study

Alt6


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Percentages represent the proposed district's estimated variance or deviation from a perfectly balanced population distribution.

Disclaimer: The data displayed is provided without warranty and that the user should consult public primary information sources, such as recorded deeds and plats, to verify the accuracy of the data provided.
 Data Sources: US Census Bureau, ESRI, NCCGIA, Brunswick County, H2GO, CFCOG.



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Alt1	Total Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority	Share of Minority	% Hispanic/Latino	Share of Hispanic/Latino
1	6,987	866	245	6,822	165	2.4%	12.4%	11.5%	3.5%	10.4%
2	6,918	1,505	340	6,822	96	1.4%	21.8%	20.0%	4.9%	14.4%
3	6,874	1,064	357	6,822	52	0.8%	15.5%	14.1%	5.2%	15.1%
4	6,766	2,535	832	6,822	(56)	-0.8%	37.5%	33.7%	12.3%	35.2%
5	6,563	1,561	587	6,822	(259)	-3.8%	23.8%	20.7%	8.9%	24.9%
TOTAL	34,108	7,531	2,361	34,110	(2)	(0)	22.1%	100.0%	6.9%	100.0%

Alt1	Voting Age Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority of Voting Age	Share of Minority Voting Age	% Hispanic/Latino of Voting Age	Share of Hispanic/Latino Voting Age
1	6,058	623	178	5,618	440	7.8%	10.3%	11.3%	2.9%	11.5%
2	5,542	1,153	251	5,618	(76)	-1.4%	20.8%	20.8%	4.5%	16.2%
3	5,852	803	245	5,618	234	4.2%	13.7%	14.5%	4.2%	15.8%
4	5,294	1,850	510	5,618	(324)	-5.8%	34.9%	33.5%	9.6%	32.9%
5	5,345	1,101	367	5,618	(273)	-4.9%	20.6%	19.9%	6.9%	23.7%
TOTAL	28,091	5,530	1,551	28,090	1	0	19.7%	100.0%	5.5%	100.0%

Alt2	Total Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority	Share of Minority	% Hispanic/Latino	Share of Hispanic/Latino
1	6,536	775	258	6,822	(286)	-4.2%	11.9%	10.3%	3.9%	11.0%
2	7,232	1,258	253	6,822	410	6.0%	17.4%	16.6%	3.5%	10.8%
3	6,820	1,324	370	6,822	(2)	0.0%	19.4%	17.5%	5.4%	15.8%
4	6,589	1,844	668	6,822	(233)	-3.4%	28.0%	24.4%	10.1%	28.5%
5	6,931	2,355	791	6,822	109	1.6%	34.0%	31.2%	11.4%	33.8%
TOTAL	34,108	7,556	2,340	34,110	(2)	(0)	22.2%	100.0%	6.9%	100.0%

Alt2	Voting Age Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority of Voting Age	Share of Minority Voting Age	% Hispanic/Latino of Voting Age	Share of Hispanic/Latino Voting Age
1	5,873	603	193	5,618	255	4.5%	10.3%	10.9%	3.3%	12.4%
2	5,709	890	166	5,618	91	1.6%	15.6%	16.1%	2.9%	10.7%
3	5,788	999	272	5,618	170	3.0%	17.3%	18.1%	4.7%	17.5%
4	5,258	1,371	446	5,618	(360)	-6.4%	26.1%	24.8%	8.5%	28.7%
5	5,463	1,667	477	5,618	(155)	-2.8%	30.5%	30.1%	8.7%	30.7%
TOTAL	28,091	5,530	1,554	28,090	1	0	19.7%	100.0%	5.5%	100.0%

Alt3	Total Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority	Share of Minority	% Hispanic/Latino	Share of Hispanic/Latino
1	7,324	897	235	6,822	502	7.4%	12.2%	11.9%	3.2%	10.0%
2	6,853	1,615	402	6,822	31	0.5%	23.6%	21.4%	5.9%	17.0%
3	6,975	1,081	367	6,822	153	2.2%	15.5%	14.4%	5.3%	15.5%
4	6,632	2,681	877	6,822	(190)	-2.8%	40.4%	35.6%	13.2%	37.1%
5	6,324	1,257	480	6,822	(498)	-7.3%	19.9%	16.7%	7.6%	20.3%
TOTAL	34,108	7,531	2,361	34,110	(2)	(0)	22.1%	100.0%	6.9%	100.0%

Alt3	Voting Age Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority of Voting Age	Share of Minority Voting Age	% Hispanic/Latino of Voting Age	Share of Hispanic/Latino Voting Age
1	6,395	649	169	5,618	777	13.8%	10.1%	11.7%	2.6%	10.9%
2	5,464	1,225	279	5,618	(154)	-2.7%	22.4%	22.2%	5.1%	18.0%
3	5,949	819	255	5,618	331	5.9%	13.8%	14.8%	4.3%	16.4%
4	5,126	1,948	537	5,618	(492)	-8.8%	38.0%	35.2%	10.5%	34.6%
5	5,157	889	311	5,618	(461)	-8.2%	17.2%	16.1%	6.0%	20.1%
TOTAL	28,091	5,530	1,551	28,090	1	0	19.7%	100.0%	5.5%	100.0%

Alt4	Total Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority	Share of Minority	% Hispanic/Latino	Share of Hispanic/Latino
1	7,374	903	240	6,822	552	8.1%	12.2%	12.0%	3.3%	10.2%
2	6,660	1,700	376	6,822	(162)	-2.4%	25.5%	22.6%	5.6%	15.9%
3	6,874	1,064	357	6,822	52	0.8%	15.5%	14.1%	5.2%	15.1%
4	6,876	2,607	908	6,822	54	0.8%	37.9%	34.6%	13.2%	38.5%
5	6,324	1,257	480	6,822	(498)	-7.3%	19.9%	16.7%	7.6%	20.3%
TOTAL	34,108	7,531	2,361	34,110	(2)	(0)	22.1%	100.0%	6.9%	100.0%

Alt4	Voting Age Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority of Voting Age	Share of Minority Voting Age	% Hispanic/Latino of Voting Age	Share of Hispanic/Latino Voting Age
1	6,432	651	170	5,618	814	14.5%	10.1%	11.8%	2.6%	11.0%
2	5,283	1,290	270	5,618	(335)	-6.0%	24.4%	23.3%	5.1%	17.4%
3	5,852	803	245	5,618	234	4.2%	13.7%	14.5%	4.2%	15.8%
4	5,367	1,897	555	5,618	(251)	-4.5%	35.3%	34.3%	10.3%	35.8%
5	5,157	889	311	5,618	(461)	-8.2%	17.2%	16.1%	6.0%	20.1%
TOTAL	28,091	5,530	1,551	28,090	1	0	19.7%	100.0%	5.5%	100.0%

Alt5	Total Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority	Share of Minority	% Hispanic/Latino	Share of Hispanic/Latino
1	6,964	882	226	6,822	142	2.1%	12.7%	11.7%	3.2%	9.6%
2	6,660	1,700	376	6,822	(162)	-2.4%	25.5%	22.6%	5.6%	15.9%
3	6,874	1,064	357	6,822	52	0.8%	15.5%	14.1%	5.2%	15.1%
4	6,876	2,607	908	6,822	54	0.8%	37.9%	34.6%	13.2%	38.5%
5	6,734	1,278	494	6,822	(88)	-1.3%	19.0%	17.0%	7.3%	20.9%
TOTAL	34,108	7,531	2,361	34,110	(2)	(0)	22.1%	100.0%	6.9%	100.0%

Alt5	Voting Age Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority of Voting Age	Share of Minority Voting Age	% Hispanic/Latino of Voting Age	Share of Hispanic/Latino Voting Age
1	6,035	631	158	5,618	417	7.4%	10.5%	11.4%	2.6%	10.2%
2	5,283	1,290	270	5,618	(335)	-6.0%	24.4%	23.3%	5.1%	17.4%
3	5,852	803	245	5,618	234	4.2%	13.7%	14.5%	4.2%	15.8%
4	5,367	1,897	555	5,618	(251)	-4.5%	35.3%	34.3%	10.3%	35.8%
5	5,554	909	323	5,618	(64)	-1.1%	16.4%	16.4%	5.8%	20.8%
TOTAL	28,091	5,530	1,551	28,090	1	0	19.7%	100.0%	5.5%	100.0%

Alt6	Total Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority	Share of Minority	% Hispanic/Latino	Share of Hispanic/Latino
1	6,914	876	221	6,822	92	1.3%	12.7%	11.6%	3.2%	9.4%
2	6,710	1,706	381	6,822	(112)	-1.6%	25.4%	22.7%	5.7%	16.1%
3	6,874	1,064	357	6,822	52	0.8%	15.5%	14.1%	5.2%	15.1%
4	6,876	2,607	908	6,822	54	0.8%	37.9%	34.6%	13.2%	38.5%
5	6,734	1,278	494	6,822	(88)	-1.3%	19.0%	17.0%	7.3%	20.9%
TOTAL	34,108	7,531	2,361	34,110	(2)	(0)	22.1%	100.0%	6.9%	100.0%

Alt6	Voting Age Population						Percentages			
	Population	Minority Population	Hispanic/Latino Population	Balanced Population	Variance #	Variance %	% Minority of Voting Age	Share of Minority Voting Age	% Hispanic/Latino of Voting Age	Share of Hispanic/Latino Voting Age
1	5,998	629	157	5,618	380	6.8%	10.5%	11.4%	2.6%	10.1%
2	5,320	1,292	271	5,618	(298)	-5.3%	24.3%	23.4%	5.1%	17.5%
3	5,852	803	245	5,618	234	4.2%	13.7%	14.5%	4.2%	15.8%
4	5,367	1,897	555	5,618	(251)	-4.5%	35.3%	34.3%	10.3%	35.8%
5	5,554	909	323	5,618	(64)	-1.1%	16.4%	16.4%	5.8%	20.8%
TOTAL	28,091	5,530	1,551	28,090	1	0	19.7%	100.0%	5.5%	100.0%